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ter Doest et al. / STIMULUS ABSTRACTION
LINGUISTIC CONTEXT
AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION







This article considers the role of linguistic context in social memory and social judgment.
Two experiments compared perceivers’ responses to person descriptions formulated at a
high level of linguistic abstraction (adjectives/traits) versus a low level of linguistic
abstraction (action verbs/behaviors). Based on the linguistic category model, together
with prior empirical findings in psychology and linguistics, traits as compared with
behavioral descriptions of a social target were hypothesized to elicit lower attention,
poorer recall, and more expectancy-consistent impressions. Support for these hypotheses
was obtained for a social target consisting of an individual as well as a nonentitative
group. These results suggest a moderating role of linguistic context in inconsistency pro-
cessing. Whereas concrete (behavioral) person descriptions elicited relatively deep, sys-
tematic processing, abstract (trait) person descriptions elicited more cursory, heuristic
processing guided by the perceiver’s expectancies regarding the target person. It is con-
cluded that the methodological and substantive implications of linguistic context deserve
greater attention in social psychological research.
How do we deal with events or situations that deviate from our
expectations? How do we respond when we witness our introverted sci-
entist painting the town red? Such situations constitute critical moments
when we must either reaffirm or adjust our views about people. Not
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surprisingly, how we reconcile inconsistencies in social information
poses an important topic in social psychology. Research to date has
addressed the cognitive processes underlying our responses to such
inconsistencies. Although substantial headway has been made, a full
understanding will require greater insight into the role played by con-
textual factors (e.g., Stangor & McMillan, 1992; Wyer, Lambert,
Budesheim, & Gruenfeld, 1992).
A key contextual factor in social cognition is language.As Semin and
Fiedler (1991) have noted, “Language enters social psychological phe-
nomena at all imaginable levels, not only as they are manifested in
everyday life but also in the construction of most if not all experimental
settings and instructions, and most independent and dependent mea-
sures” (p. 2). Although prior research attests to the important role of
language in social cognition (cf. Semin, 1995), no attention has been
given to its potential impact on inconsistency processing and social
judgment.
The theoretical point of departure for the present investigation of
the role of language in inconsistency processing was Semin and
Fiedler’s (1988, 1991) linguistic category model. This model offers a
taxonomy of predicate types used in interpersonal communication.
The present research focused on two of these predicate types, namely,
action verbs (e.g., “The professor danced”) and adjectives (e.g., “The
professor is lively”). According to Semin and Fiedler’s model, these two
linguistic categories lie at opposite ends of a continuum of abstractness-
concreteness in verbal representations of social phenomena. Although
prior research has documented systematic effects of linguistic abstrac-
tion on social cognition (e.g., Semin & De Poot, 1997; Semin &
Greenslade, 1985; Semin & Smith, 1999), its role in inconsistency pro-
cessing and social judgment has not yet been considered.
The two linguistic categories selected for the present research,
action verbs and adjectives, correspond to two of the most frequently
encountered forms of person information, respectively: behavioral
descriptions and trait descriptions. On one hand, these two types of
person descriptions often arise naturally, as evidenced by their inclu-
sion as central categories in empirically derived taxonomies of person
information (e.g., Beach & Wertheimer, 1961; Carlston, 1994; Fiske &
Cox, 1979; Livesley & Bromley, 1973; Semin & Fiedler, 1988). On the
other hand, trait and behavioral person descriptions have figured
prominently in social psychological research since the inception of the
field.
The prominent role of trait and behavioral person descriptions in
social psychological research can be attributed partly to their substan-
tive relevance to key research issues. In numerous content domains,
trait and behavioral characterizations constitute distinct constructs of
essential importance to the research question under investigation. For
example, research and theory on processes of attribution (e.g., Jones &
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Davis, 1965; Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961; Kelley, 1967) and spontane-
ous trait inference (e.g., Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Winter
& Uleman, 1984) have directly considered how social perceivers infer
traits or other enduring dispositions from behavioral information.
In other social judgment domains, however, trait language and
behavioral language have been used in research paradigms not for
substantive reasons but primarily as a matter of methodological tradi-
tion. For example, a popular question for social psychologists in the
1950s and 1960s concerned information integration, that is,how multi-
ple stimuli describing a person are combined to form a single inte-
grated impression. In the dominant paradigm used to investigate this
issue (Asch, 1946), the multiple stimuli took the form of trait lists; only
very few information integration studies used nontrait stimuli (e.g.,
Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979). Person memory offers a second exam-
ple. Research in this domain was inspired by fundamental questions
concerning the influence of social expectations on memory: Are we
better able to recall information that confirms or disconfirms our
expectations of other people? In the dominant methodological para-
digm for person memory research (Hastie & Kumar, 1979), social
expectations are elicited by means of traits ascribed to a target person
and the (expectancy-relevant) information that participants must
later recall takes the form of behavioral descriptions.
An important issue raised by the latter type of research paradigm,
in which trait or behavioral language has provided a basis for explor-
ing more general processes of social judgment, is whether findings can
be expected to generalize to other types of language. For instance, can
we assume that the detailed insights gained from years of research on
person memory apply to all forms of person information (as suggested
by countless reviewers of this literature)? Or alternatively, are these
insights limited to memory for the type of verbal stimuli that research
participants actually recalled in the vast majority of these studies,
namely, behavioral information? The present research investigated
the possibility that there may be important differences in how social
perceivers process and encode behavioral versus trait language in
memory, systematically influencing outcomes in the domains of incon-
sistency processing and social judgment.
LANGUAGE ABSTRACTION, PERSON MEMORY,
AND SOCIAL JUDGMENT
To date, inconsistency processing has been investigated primarily in
studies of the memorability of expectancy-consistent versus expectancy-
inconsistent person descriptions. The literature on person memory
documents a clear attentional and memory bias favoring inconsistent
over consistent information (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Higgins &
Bargh, 1987, Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999;
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J. W. Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998; Srull, 1981; Srull,
Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1985; Stangor & Duan, 1991; Wyer &
Gordon, 1982). In line with the notion of levels of processing (Baddeley,
Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik & Lockhart, 1972), this
attentional and recall advantage is assumed to be a manifestation of
deeper processing, and hence deeper encoding, of inconsistent as com-
pared with consistent information. Based on these findings, research-
ers have concluded that perceivers confronted with expectancy-
inconsistent information engage in effortful cognitive processing
aimed at resolving inconsistencies and making sense of unexpected
information (Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989;
Stangor & McMillan, 1992; see the review by Smith, 1998).
What might be the implications of trait versus behavioral language
for this consistently observed memory bias favoring unexpected over
expected information? One indication of this variable’s potential
impact on the encoding of expectancy-relevant information can be
found in Stangor and McMillan’s (1992) secondary analysis of the per-
son memory literature. This meta-analysis showed a strong associa-
tion between the linguistic abstraction of social stimuli (i.e., use of trait
versus behavioral person descriptions) and relative recall for expectancy-
inconsistent compared to expectancy-consistent information: On one
hand, studies of recall for behavioral information (n = 33), as in the tra-
ditional Hastie and Kumar (1979) paradigm, tended to show better
recall for expectancy-inconsistent information; on the other hand,
studies of recall for trait information (n = 4) tended to show better
recall for expectancy-consistent information.
Although these meta-analytic findings suggest a fundamental dif-
ference in inconsistency processing engaged by behavioral versus trait
person descriptions, we regard them with some caution. This is not
only because of the specific limitations1 of the data on which they are
based but also for theoretical reasons.Are there theoretical grounds for
predicting differences in the processing and recall of expectancy-
relevant person descriptions, depending on their level of linguistic
abstraction? Before turning to this question, we will consider addi-
tional empirical evidence suggesting that behavioral and trait person
descriptions differ not only in how they are encoded and recalled but
also in the social judgments to which they give rise.
Prior social psychological research is suggestive of a broad tendency
for judgments based on abstract language to be more strongly influ-
enced by preexisting knowledge structures than judgments based on
concrete language (e.g., Semin, 1989; Semin & Fiedler, 1988, Experi-
ment 2; Semin & Greenslade, 1985; see also S. J. Sherman, Beike, &
Ryalls, 1999). In a similar vein, research conducted within the frame-
work of action identification theory (Wegner & Vallacher, 1986) sug-
gests that participants are more resistant to new conceptualizations of
an event when they are led to think about the event at a high level of
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abstraction (e.g., in terms of the event’s effects or implications) com-
pared to a low level of abstraction (e.g., in terms of the event’s specific
details; Vallacher & Selz, 1991; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji,
1986). These findings suggest that perceivers forming judgments
based on concrete language may give relatively high weight to the
information given and relatively low weight to prior expectancies. On
the other hand, perceivers forming judgments based on abstract lan-
guage appear to give relatively low weight to the information given and
relatively high weight to prior expectancies. To borrow Bruner’s (1973)
words, our tendency to “go beyond the information given” seems to hold
most strongly when stimuli are represented at a high level of language
abstraction; in the case of concrete information, this tendency is less
pronounced.
LANGUAGE ABSTRACTION AND DEPTH OF PROCESSING
Additional empirical evidence from outside social psychology sug-
gests a basis for predicting and accounting for differences in how
behavioral language and trait language are processed, encoded, and
used to form social judgments. Research in the fields of cognitive psy-
chology and linguistics has yielded a substantial body of evidence that
concrete verbal stimuli attract more attention, and are better and
more easily remembered, than abstract verbal stimuli (e.g., Campos,
1992; Day & Bellezza, 1983; Leung, Suzuki, & Foster, 1983; Marschark
& Surian, 1992; Mishra, 1984; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Paivio, 1971;
Ransdell & Fischler, 1989; Sadoski, Goetz, & Fritz, 1993; Zhang &
Peng, 1990; for a review, see Marschark & Cornoldi, 1991). If it can be
assumed that patterns in attention and recall reflect differences in
level of processing (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972), these findings would
suggest that concrete language elicits generally deeper levels of pro-
cessing and encoding than abstract language. In other words, if one
were to represent a fight as “John punched David,” it should be more
deeply processed, and better recalled, than if the very same event was
represented as “John is aggressive.” These empirically derived predic-
tions formed the first two hypotheses for the present research.
What implications might such an overall difference in levels of pro-
cessing elicited by concrete and abstract language have for memory
and judgments based on behavioral versus trait stimuli? First, this
tendency could explain the moderating effect of stimulus abstraction
observed in Stangor and McMillan’s (1992) meta-analysis of person
memory studies. As discussed above, the recall (and attentional) bias
favoring inconsistent over consistent information observed in person
memory studies is widely regarded as a reflection of inconsistency res-
olution, that is, the perceiver’s active, effortful attempt to resolve
inconsistencies between prior expectancies and newly received person
information. Based on their findings, Stangor and McMillan argued
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that more effortful processing (and hence better recall) of inconsistent
stimuli will arise only when processing circumstances (e.g., task and
environmental characteristics) enable perceivers to carry out the cog-
nitive work of inconsistency resolution. However, it could be that one
such processing circumstance is stimulus abstraction: If abstract as
compared with concrete stimuli do elicit substantially lower levels of
cognitive engagement and effort, then (abstract) trait person descrip-
tions may fail to provide the essential conditions for inconsistency
resolution.
In line with empirical findings reviewed in the previous section, we
predicted moderating effects of stimulus abstraction in patterns of
both attention and recall: On one hand, (concrete) behavioral person
descriptions were expected to give rise to inconsistency resolution (evi-
denced by greater attention to and recall of inconsistent behavioral
stimuli); on the other hand, (abstract) trait descriptions were not
expected to give rise to such inconsistency resolution. Moreover, in line
with the arguments given above, depth of processing was predicted to
mediate this relationship between stimulus abstraction and inconsis-
tency resolution.
Overall differences in the depth of processing elicited by concrete
versus abstract language were predicted to have implications not only
for memory but also for social judgment. Dual processing modes char-
acterized by differential depth of processing form a core assumption in
judgment models in a variety of social psychological domains (e.g.,
Brewer, 1988; Chaiken, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; for a review, see Smith &
DeCoster, 1999). One mode, which we refer to as heuristic processing
(following Chaiken, 1987), involves superficial, cursory attention to
and processing of the information given, leading to judgments heavily
influenced by preexisting knowledge (e.g., expectations, heuristic
cues). The second mode, systematic processing, is characterized by
more effortful attention to and deeper processing of the information
given, leading to judgments that are less influenced by expectations or
heuristics. If (abstract) trait stimuli do elicit less effortful processing
than (concrete) behavioral stimuli, one might expect judgments based
on trait stimuli to be more strongly influenced by preexisting
knowledge.
This line of reasoning yielded additional hypotheses about the
nature of social judgments based on concrete versus abstract person
descriptions. In line with empirical findings reviewed in the previous
section, we predicted that perceivers would form more expectancy-
consistent impressions of social targets described in (abstract) trait
language as compared with (concrete) behavioral language. Moreover,
depth of processing was predicted to mediate this relationship between
stimulus abstraction and the expectancy-consistency of impressions.
Finally, we predicted that the relative judgmental weight given to
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expectancies versus the stimulus information would be higher in per-
son impressions formed on the basis of (abstract) trait stimuli as com-
pared with (concrete) behavioral stimuli.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was modeled as closely as possible on the standard
paradigm used in person memory research (Hastie & Kumar, 1979). In
this paradigm, participants are first given introductory information
about a target person, serving to establish expectations. Then partici-
pants are shown a number of stimulus items, some consistent and
some inconsistent with their expectations of the target person. After
some delay, memory for the stimulus information is assessed.
The standard person memory paradigm was adopted with three
modifications. First, a between-subjects variable was added: stimulus
abstraction. For participants in the (abstract) trait condition, the stim-
ulus items consisted only of trait information; for participants in the
(concrete) behavior condition, the stimulus items consisted only of
behavioral information. The second important departure from the per-
son memory paradigm lay in the materials used to elicit expectations
about the target person. Instead of trait descriptions, as in the stan-
dard paradigm, biographical sketches were used to elicit expectancies
in the present research; these biographical sketches did not include
any trait characterizations or behavioral instances. Third, after
assessment of memory for the stimulus information, participants also




Participants took part in the experiment in groups of 5 to 15. Each
participant occupied a separate cubicle containing a personal com-
puter. Instructions displayed on the computer screen informed partici-
pants that their task was to form a general impression of a target per-
son. They were told to expect a biographical sketch describing the
target, followed by additional statements from interviews with per-
sons who knew the target; they were told that each statement had been
made by a different member of the target’s social network (a procedure
introduced by Asch, 1946). Then the biographical sketch was displayed
on the computer screen for 60 seconds, together with instructions that
the sketch should be read carefully several times. The sketch served to
establish target expectancies. Next, 18 statements about the target
ter Doest et al. / STIMULUS ABSTRACTION 201
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 30, 2010jls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
were presented in random order, each on a separate screen. These 18
statements included 6 expectancy-consistent stimulus items,6 expectancy-
inconsistent stimulus items, and 6 filler items that were irrelevant to
target expectancies. Participants themselves determined how long
each stimulus item appeared on the screen, indicating their readiness
to view each subsequent item with a mouse click.Observation times for
each item were recorded on the computer.
Following presentation of the stimulus information, participants
were given a 5-minute filler task. Then participants spent another 5
minutes completing a (surprise) free recall task; they were instructed
to write down everything they could remember about the target infor-
mation. Next, participants filled out a written questionnaire in which
they provided various judgments of the target and of the separate com-
ponents of the stimulus materials.
After completing the written questionnaire, participants were given
a final task on the computer: a test of their reading speed. The results
of this test were used, together with actual observation times, to derive
an estimate of attention to the stimulus items. Actual observation
times did not by themselves provide a basis for comparing attention to
the trait and behavioral stimulus items because the trait items con-
tained fewer words than the behavioral items. For this comparison,
attention to the stimulus items was estimated as the difference
between actual observation times and the time participants spent
reading sentences of the same length in the test of reading speed. The
stimuli for the test of reading speed consisted of 18 sentences matched
in length (i.e., number of syllables) to the 18 stimulus items used in the
actual experiment. Each sentence was presented on a separate screen.
Participants were told that their reading speed was being tested and
that their task was to read each sentence as quickly as possible and
then respond immediately with a mouse click. Several measures were
taken to encourage participants simply to read the sentences without
spending any extra time thinking about sentence content: Uninterest-
ing sentences were selected, and participants were assured that they
would not be asked to recall or answer any questions about the sen-
tences. After the test of reading speed, participants were debriefed,
thanked, and paid.
Participants. Participants were 106 paid volunteers (45 male, 61
female) at the Free University Amsterdam with an average age of 21.7
years (range: 18 to 35 years). They were recruited via a university
newspaper and received 8 Dutch guilders (about $5) for taking part in
the experiment, which lasted approximately 30 minutes and was con-
ducted in the Dutch language.
Design. The main independent variables concerned features of the
stimulus items. The 12 expectancy-relevant stimulus items varied
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between participants in their abstractness: They were either all traits
(high stimulus abstraction) or all behaviors (low stimulus abstraction).
Both stimulus sets also varied on two within-subjects dimensions: con-
sistency with expectancies about the target person (consistent, incon-
sistent), and evaluative valence (positive, negative). Evaluative
valence was included as a control variable in view of its demonstrated
effects on cognitive processing (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991; Skowronski
& Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991). One additional between-subjects vari-
able,gender of target,was included for purposes of counterbalancing.
Stimulus materials. Biographical sketches of two targets, one male
and one female, were developed as a basis for eliciting expectancies.
These two sketches needed to be complementary; that is, they needed
to enable counterbalancing of the stimulus items such that the
expected items for one target could serve as unexpected items for the
other.The person categories businessman and housewife were selected
as the basis for the biographical sketches because reanalyses of data
reported by Vonk and Olde Monnikhof (1998) indicated that the two
gender subtypes elicit consistent, complementary expectations in
Dutch respondents.2
Biographical sketches of the businessman and housewife were
developed in successive pilot studies. These sketches consisted partly
of information that varied over the two target persons (e.g., educa-
tional attainment, occupation). This information, which was included
to enhance the strength and complementarity of expectancies, served
to reinforce gender-stereotypic expectancies elicited by the subtypes
businessman and housewife. The sketches also included information
that was held constant over the two target gender conditions (e.g., age,
marital status, and number of children). This information was
included to make the sketches more realistic and to decrease the
salience of the gender-stereotypic information. The male and female
targets were referred to in the sketches, and throughout the experi-
ment, as Michael Brown and Marion Brown, respectively. (English
translations of the two biographical sketches are displayed in Appen-
dix A.)
Stimulus items. Two sets of stimulus items were developed: one set
of 12 traits (e.g., “Michael [Marion] Brown is empathic”) and one set of
12 behaviors (e.g., “Michael [Marion] Brown cried while watching a
documentary on famine in Africa”). All stimulus items were generated
by respondents in pilot studies and then rated by other respondents
both on consistency with expectations elicited by the biographical
sketches and on evaluative valence. The pilot data were used to select
one trait stimulus set and one behavioral stimulus set with the follow-
ing characteristics: (a) There was a rough one-to-one semantic corre-
spondence between items in the two stimulus sets, such that each item
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in the behavior set implied one of the traits in the trait set; (b) within
each set of stimulus items, the two within-subjects factors (expectancy-
consistency and valence) were orthogonally crossed; and (c) all
expectancy-consistent stimulus items for the male target were
expectancy-inconsistent for the female target, and vice versa.3 (Eng-
lish translations of all stimulus items are displayed in Appendix B.)
Six expectancy-irrelevant items were included to make the stimulus
sets more varied and realistic. These items consisted of neither traits
nor behaviors (e.g., “Michael [Marion] Brown has five cousins”). One
expectancy-irrelevant item was always presented as the first stimulus
item, and one was always presented last, to attenuate primacy and
recency effects involving the expectancy-relevant stimulus items. The
other 4 irrelevant items were presented in random order together with
the 12 expectancy-relevant items.
Dependent Measures
Unless otherwise indicated, all responses were given on 7-point
scales.
Free recall. Participants were given 5 minutes (or longer, if they
needed more time) to write down everything they could recall about the
target person on a blank sheet of paper.
Descriptive target impressions. The biographical sketches served to
establish expectancies in line with traditional gender stereotypes,with
high (low) activity and potency expected of the male (female) target.
The degree to which impressions of the target were consistent with
these expectancies was assessed with two types of measures.
1. Global measure. Two pairs of items measured the expectancy-consistency
of impressions in terms of global assessments of the degree to which the
target fit traditional male and female stereotypes, respectively (viz., “To
what extent does Michael [Marion] Brown show traditionally feminine
[masculine] characteristics [behaviors]?”; scale anchors: scarcely, a
great deal). The two items concerning the target’s own-gender consis-
tency, together with reverse codings of the two items concerning other-
gender consistency, formed a 4-item scale.
2. Semantic-Differential measure. Target impressions were also assessed
with a validated Dutch version of the Semantic Differential (Kouwer,
1958; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Scale anchors consisted of
pairs of trait antonyms (e.g., weak, strong), none of which showed sub-
stantial semantic overlap with any trait stimulus item. Two of the three
Semantic Differential subscales (viz., Activity and Potency; reverse
coded for the female target) provided a second basis for measuring the
expectancy-consistency of target impressions.
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Evaluative target impressions. Target impressions were also
assessed in terms of their evaluative valence. Evaluative target
impressions, together with participants’ evaluative ratings of the bio-
graphical sketch and the stimulus items (see the next section), were
used to estimate the relative judgmental weight participants gave to
expectancies (i.e., evaluative ratings of the biographical sketch) and to
the information given (i.e., evaluative ratings of the stimulus items) in
arriving at their actual evaluative impressions of the target.
Evaluative target impressions were assessed with two scales compara-
ble to those used to measure descriptive target impressions.
1. Global measure.A two-item scale assessed global evaluative impression
of the target (e.g., “What is your general impression of Michael [Marion]
Brown?”; scale anchors: negative, positive).
2. Semantic-Differential measure. The Evaluation subscale of the Seman-
tic Differential provided a second measure of evaluative impressions of
the target.
Evaluative ratings of biographical sketch and stimulus items. At the
end of the written questionnaire, participants provided evaluative rat-
ings of the two main components of the stimulus information (viz., the
biographical sketch and the stimulus items) considered in isolation.
First, they rated a prototypical person with the characteristics listed in
the biographical sketch on a 2-item scale identical to that used to
assess global evaluative impressions of the target. Then they provided
evaluative ratings of each of the 12 expectancy-relevant stimulus
items (scale anchors: negative, positive). These 12 ratings were aver-
aged to form a single measure of evaluative response to the stimulus
items.
Estimated attention. As mentioned above, participants themselves
determined how long they viewed each stimulus item, and observation
times for each item were recorded on the computer. These observation
times did not directly provide a useful basis for comparing attention to
trait and behavioral stimuli because the trait items contained consid-
erably fewer words than the behavioral items. For the purposes of this
comparison, attention to each stimulus item was estimated (for each
participant) as the difference between time spent observing the stimu-
lus item and time spent reading an item of the same length in the




Unless otherwise stated, the distributional and other assumptions
of parametric statistics were tested and found to be fulfilled in all
ter Doest et al. / STIMULUS ABSTRACTION 205
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 30, 2010jls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
analyses reported in this article, as were the additional assumptions of
analysis of variance (ANOVA) (e.g., homogeneity of variance), analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) (e.g., homogeneity of regression), and multi-
ple regression (e.g., linearity).
Depth of Processing
Attention. Scores representing estimated attention to the stimulus
items were analyzed in an ANOVA (following square-root transforma-
tion to meet distributional assumptions), with one between-subjects
variable (stimulus abstraction: trait stimuli vs. behavioral stimuli)
and two within-subjects variables (consistency of stimulus item with
expectancy: consistent, inconsistent;and valence of stimulus item:pos-
itive, negative).5 The main hypothesis was that expectancy-inconsistent
stimuli would receive greater attention than expectancy-consistent
stimuli in the behavior condition but not in the trait condition. The pre-
dicted Stimulus Abstraction × Consistency interaction showed a
nonsignificant trend, F(1, 104) = 2.93, p = .09. Visual inspection of the
associated means suggested that attention to inconsistent stimuli
exceeded attention to consistent stimuli by a greater margin in the
behavior condition (nontransformed means: MI = 3.5 s, MC = 2.9 s) than
in the trait condition (nontransformed means: MI = 2.3 s, MC = 2.1 s).
Although this interaction was nonsignificant, the predicted simple
main effects were examined in view of their theoretical relevance (and
because the ANOVA interaction term may provide an overly conserva-
tive test in view of the large associated main effects; e.g., Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1985; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1995). The greater attention given
to inconsistent compared to consistent items was found to be a signifi-
cant difference in the behavior condition, F(1, 104) = 12.18, p < .01, but
not in the trait condition, F(1, 104) = 1.05, p = .31.
Furthermore, the prediction of an overall attentional difference
between traits and behaviors received support. Attention to the stimu-
lus items was substantially lower in the trait condition than in the
behavior condition, F(1, 104) = 14.05, p < .001. There was also a main
effect for expectancy-consistency, suggesting an overall tendency
toward greater attention to inconsistent items than to consistent
items, F(1, 104) = 10.09, p < .01.
Free recall. Correct recall for the stimulus information was coded
using a gist criterion. Recall responses that did not show substantial
semantic overlap with any component of the original stimulus infor-
mation were coded as intrusions into memory. One coder rated all of
the recall data; a second coder, blind to the experimental hypotheses,
rated a randomly selected subset (viz., 33%; as in prior person memory
research, e.g., Srull, 1981). Correspondence between the two coders’
ratings was high (Cronbach’s α = .99).
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The prediction of greater recall for expectancy-inconsistent than for
expectancy-consistent information in the behavior condition, but no
such difference in the trait condition, was examined in an ANOVA,
with one between-subjects variable (stimulus abstraction: trait,
behavior) and two within-subjects variables (consistency of recalled
item with target expectancies: consistent, inconsistent; and valence of
recalled item: positive, negative).6 The predicted interaction between
stimulus abstraction and consistency was significant, F(1, 104) = 6.25,
p < .05. Visual inspection of the means associated with this interaction,
which are displayed in Table 1, suggested that whereas recall for con-
sistent items exceeded recall for inconsistent items in the trait condi-
tion, inconsistent items were recalled better than consistent items in
the behavior condition. However, the simple main effects associated
with this crossover interaction indicated that the difference in levels of
recall for consistent and inconsistent information was significant in
the behavior condition, F(1, 104) = 4.38, p < .05, but not in the trait con-
dition, p = .15.
The ANOVA also revealed significant main effects for stimulus
abstraction and valence. As predicted, the proportion of correctly
recalled stimulus items was lower in the trait condition (M = .46) than
in the behavior condition (M = .57), F(1, 104) = 11.99, p < .01. Also,
recall was poorer for positive stimulus items (M = .49) than for negative
stimulus items (M = .55), F(1, 104) = 5.12, p < .05.7
Using the procedures outlined by Baron, Kenny, and colleagues
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998), two mediational
analyses were conducted to gain further insight into these patterns in
the recall data. First, an ANCOVA tested whether the significantly
greater overall recall for behavioral as compared with trait stimuli
could indeed be attributed to deeper processing of behavioral versus
trait stimuli, the latter operationalized as estimated attention. This
ANCOVA included overall recall for the stimulus items as the depend-
ent variable, stimulus abstraction as the independent variable, and
overall estimated attention (transformed) as a covariate. The results
suggested partial mediation by overall attention of the superior recall
observed for behaviors versus traits, Sobel’s Z = 2.40, p < .01. The ini-
tially strong main effect of stimulus abstraction, F(1, 104) = 11.52, p <
.01, decreased substantially but did not disappear following entry of
the covariate, F(1, 103) = 6.11, p < .05. The covariate also showed a sig-
nificant regression effect, F(1, 103) = 4.68, p < .05.
A second ANCOVA was carried out to test whether the overall differ-
ence in depth of processing could account for the observed relationship
between stimulus abstraction and inconsistency resolution. The
dependent variable in this analysis consisted of a single proportion
representing the number of expectancy-consistent stimulus items
recalled as a proportion of the total number of stimulus items recalled.
The independent variable and covariate were, respectively, stimulus
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abstraction and overall estimated attention to the stimulus items,as in
the first ANCOVA. The results yielded evidence that differential depth
of processing mediated the superior recall observed for behavior versus
trait stimulus items, Sobel’s Z = 2.21, p < .05. The initially significant
main effect of stimulus abstraction on inconsistency resolution, F(1,
104) = 5.31, p < .05, fell to a nonsignificant level following entry of the
covariate, F(1, 103) = 2.11, p = .15. The covariate also showed a signifi-
cant regression effect, F(1, 103) = 4.45, p < .05.
Intrusions into recall. Compared to prior person memory research
(e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981), the present research showed
a relatively large number of intrusions into free recall. To explore pos-
sible reasons for the unusually large number of intrusions, these recall
responses were coded and analyzed on two dimensions: consistency
with target expectancies and the abstraction of the stimulus items that
gave rise to the intrusion (i.e., trait versus behavior). Expectancy-
consistency of the intrusions was rated by respondents (n = 29) who
had not participated in the experiment itself. For each intrusion, the
respondents assessed the likelihood that a person with the character-
istics listed in the relevant biographical sketch would display the
behavior or quality denoted by the intrusion. Based on these ratings,
each intrusion was classified as either consistent or inconsistent with
expectancies. In addition, each intrusion was coded as to whether a
respondent in the trait condition or the behavior condition had gener-
ated it. (Intrusions in the trait condition consisted nearly exclusively of
traits, and intrusions in the behavior condition consisted nearly exclu-
sively of behaviors.)
The average number of intrusions per participant was higher in the
trait condition (M = 0.71) than in the behavior condition (M = 0.28), and
there were more expectancy-consistent intrusions (M = 0.36) than
expectancy-inconsistent intrusions (M = 0.13). In view of their skewed
distributions, these intrusion frequencies were assessed using non-
parametric tests. The greater number of intrusions in the trait versus
behavior conditions (a between-subjects difference) was found to be
significant in a Mann-Whitney test (Z = –4.2, p < .001). The higher
number of expectancy-consistent than expectancy-inconsistent
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Table 1
Proportion of Correctly Recalled Stimulus Items by Stimulus Abstraction and
Expectancy-Consistency of Stimulus Item (Experiment 1)
Stimulus Abstraction
Expectancy-Consistency of Stimulus Item Low (Behaviors) High (Traits)
Consistent items .53 .50
Inconsistent items .61 .44
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intrusions (a within-subjects difference) was also found to be signifi-
cant in a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (Z = –2.65, p < .01).
Judgmental Indicators
Descriptive target impressions. We predicted more expectancy-
consistent impressions of the target in the trait condition than in the
behavior condition. This hypothesis was tested in relation to descrip-
tive target impressions in an ANOVA, with stimulus abstraction as a
between-subjects independent variable.
For the sake of simplicity, this analysis employed a single dependent
measure of the descriptive expectancy-consistency of target impres-
sions.8 This variable was formed by averaging over all items from the
global and Semantic-Differential measures of expectancy-consistency
(Cronbach’s α = .87). High values on this composite scale indicated
expectancy-consistent impressions. This ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for stimulus abstraction, F(1, 103) = 5.81, p < .05. The
associated means were in line with the hypothesis. Impressions were
more consistent with expectancies in the trait condition (M = 4.6) than
in the behavior condition (M = 4.3).
We also predicted that depth of processing would mediate this rela-
tionship between stimulus abstraction and the expectancy-consistency
of descriptive impressions. There were no grounds to test this
mediational hypothesis, however, because depth of processing
(operationalized as estimated attention) showed no relationship with
the expectancy-consistency of descriptive target impressions (Baron &
Kenny, 1986).
Evaluative target impressions. A further prediction was that differ-
ential judgmental weight would be given to expectancies as compared
to the actual stimulus items, depending on whether the stimulus items
consisted of traits or behaviors. More specifically, the relative judg-
mental weight given to expectancies was predicted to be higher in the
trait condition than in the behavior condition. This hypothesis was
tested in analyses of the three types of evaluative ratings that partici-
pants provided at the end of the written questionnaire: their
evaluative ratings of the target person and their evaluative ratings of
the two components of the stimulus information considered in isola-
tion (viz., the biographical sketch and the stimulus items). These three
sets of evaluative ratings were analyzed in two standard regression
analyses, conducted separately for participants in the trait and behav-
ior conditions, respectively. The dependent variable in these analyses
was evaluative target impressions. To simplify the analyses, a single
dependent measure was used; this measure was an average of the
items from the global and Semantic-Differential measures of evaluative
impressions (Cronbach’s α = .92).8 The two predictor variables were
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participants’ evaluative ratings of the biographical sketch and of the
stimulus items. The regression coefficients for these two predictor
variables provided estimates of the judgmental weight given to expec-
tancies and to the stimulus items, respectively, in the formation of
evaluative impressions of the target.
The results of the regression analyses were consistent with the
research hypothesis (see Table 2). The regression analysis for the trait
condition showed a strong relationship (β = .59, p < .001) between
evaluative ratings of the biographical sketch and evaluative impres-
sions of the target yet no relationship between evaluative ratings of the
stimulus items and evaluative impressions of the target. In contrast,
the analysis for the behavior condition showed significant regression
coefficients for both the evaluative rating of the biographical sketch (β
= .33, p < .01) and evaluative rating of the stimulus items (β = .44, p <
.001). As can be seen in the right column of Table 2, the zero-order cor-
relations show the same pattern as the regression coefficients. In line
with our hypothesis, these results suggest that participants in the trait
condition based their evaluative impressions of the target primarily on
their evaluative expectancies, whereas participants in the behavior
condition gave substantial judgmental weight both to evaluative
expectancies and to their evaluative judgment of the stimulus items.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 yielded substantial support for most of
the hypotheses under investigation. First of all, person information in
the form of behavioral descriptions appeared to attract more attention,
and were better recalled, than person information in the form of trait
descriptions. Also, in line with both our prediction and prior theory
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972), the greater recall observed for behavioral as
compared with trait descriptions was found to be partially mediated by
differing levels of attention to the two types of stimuli. These findings
suggest that behavioral stimuli elicited deeper processing than trait
stimuli, leading to a corresponding difference in strength of encoding
in memory.
The overall difference in depth of processing of abstract versus con-
crete stimuli was also predicted to moderate the emergence of inconsis-
tency resolution. More specifically, deeper processing of expectancy-
inconsistent as compared with expectancy-consistent stimuli was pre-
dicted for behavioral stimuli but not for trait stimuli. Patterns of both
attention to and recall for the person descriptions were consistent with
this hypothesis (although the pattern constituted a nonsignificant
trend in the case of attention). Greater attention to and recall for
expectancy-inconsistent as compared with expectancy-consistent stim-
uli were found for behavioral descriptions but not for trait descriptions.
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Unpredicted differences in the number of intrusions into free recall
produced by the trait and behavioral stimuli suggested moreover that
the former were encoded less precisely than the latter. Post hoc analy-
ses of these intrusion data suggested that the number of intrusions
made by participants attempting to recall behavioral stimuli was com-
parable to that in prior person memory research (in which behavioral
stimuli were also used, e.g.,Srull, 1981).The relatively large number of
intrusions in the present research is primarily attributable to the fact
that the trait stimuli elicited about 2.5 times more intrusions than the
behavioral stimuli. This significant difference indicates that recall for
(abstract) trait person descriptions was not only quantitatively but
also qualitatively poorer than recall for (concrete) behavioral
descriptions.
These results concerning attention and free recall corroborate and
extend what is already known about person perception. Two key find-
ings of prior person memory research were replicated: Expectancy-
inconsistent behaviors attracted more attention (e.g., Bargh & Thein,
1985; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982; Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984)
and were better recalled (e.g., Driscoll, Hamilton, & Sorrentino, 1991;
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981; Srull et al., 1985) than expectancy-
consistent behaviors. Such greater relative attention to and recall for
inconsistent behaviors has been interpreted as a reflection of the
perceiver’s active attempt to resolve inconsistencies in person informa-
tion (e.g., Hastie, 1980, 1984; J. W. Sherman et al., 1998; Srull, 1981;
Stangor & McMillan, 1992). However, the present study showed no evi-
dence of such inconsistency resolution in the trait condition: Inconsis-
tent as compared with consistent traits did not elicit significantly
greater attention or recall. This suggests that linguistic abstraction,
namely, the use of trait versus behavioral language in person descrip-
tions, is an important contextual factor moderating whether social
perceivers engage in inconsistency resolution.
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Table 2
Prediction of Evaluative Target Impressions From Evaluative Ratings of Biographical
Sketch and of Stimulus Items (Separate Standard Regression Analyses for Trait and
Behavior Conditions, Experiment 1)
β r (Zero-Order)
Behavior condition (low stimulus abstraction)a
Evaluation biographical sketch .33** .50***
Evaluation of stimulus items .44*** .57***
Trait condition (high stimulus abstraction)b
Evaluation biographical sketch .59*** .58***
Evaluation of stimulus items –.09 .03
a. n = 51; R2 = .42.
b. n = 50; R
2
= .34.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
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The prediction that perceivers would form more expectancy-
consistent impressions on the basis of trait as compared with behav-
ioral person descriptions was also supported. Both descriptive and
evaluative impressions showed stronger relationships with prior
expectancies when impressions were formed on the basis of trait ver-
sus behavioral person descriptions. Together with the observed differ-
ences in overall attention and recall, this finding suggests that
(abstract) trait language elicits more cursory, heuristic processing,
whereas (concrete) behavioral language elicits deeper, more system-
atic processing.
Considered as a whole, the present findings provide convergent evi-
dence, on numerous process measures and judgmental outcomes, in
line with the hypothesis that linguistic abstraction moderates process-
ing style, with concrete language engaging relatively deep, systematic
processing and abstract language engaging more cursory, heuristic
processing. An important question raised by this consistent pattern of
findings is whether it reflects a common structural cause. Can the
observed memory and attentional advantage for concrete over abstract
stimuli, together with the judgmental effects, be viewed as a
generalizable, structural consequence of linguistic abstraction? Or,
alternatively, might these differences in overall attention, recall, and
judgments instead be attributable to the more context-dependent phe-
nomenon of inconsistency resolution? In other words, might they be
attributable to a tendency for behavioral descriptions of an individual
person to elicit inconsistency resolution, whereas trait descriptions do
not? Replication of the overall attentional, memory, and judgmental
effects observed in the first study—in a processing context that does
not give rise to inconsistency resolution—would suggest more broadly
generalizable processing implications of linguistic abstraction. These
implications are, namely, lower overall depth of processing, accompa-
nied by greater assimilation to expectancies, for (abstract) trait as com-
pared with (concrete) behavioral person descriptions. Such evidence of
structural consequences of linguistic abstraction could have broader
implications for the study of social cognition.
EXPERIMENT 2
This second experiment constituted a replication of the first experi-
ment in a different task context, one that is known not to elicit incon-
sistency resolution. The task context used in Experiment 1, in which
participants formed impressions of an individual target person, elicits
the implicit assumption that there is a fundamental unity to the indi-
vidual, leading perceivers to view the individual as an integrated
whole. In contrast, an aggregate group target is not necessarily
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perceived as a unified, coherent whole. Indeed, research comparing
individual and group targets has shown that perceivers do not engage
in inconsistency resolution when presented with an aggregate group
target, except in the case of an “entitative” group (i.e., a close-knit, uni-
fied group sharing a common identity; see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996;
Susskind, Maurer, Thakkar, Hamilton, & Sherman, 1999). For this rea-
son, the task context selected for Experiment 2 was impression forma-
tion in relation to a nonentitative, aggregate group target.
The method used in Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experi-
ment 1, except that the entitative individual target used in the first
experiment was replaced with a nonentitative aggregate target, that
is, an aggregate of persons eliciting no expectations of a unified, coher-
ent personality. In the absence of expectations of a coherent target per-
sonality, impression formation involves encoding and integration of
the target information only. There is no need to reconcile inconsisten-
cies within the stimulus items, regardless of whether they consist of
traits or behaviors, because nonentitative targets do not elicit inconsis-
tency resolution (e.g., Srull, 1981; Srull et al., 1985; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992; Stern et al., 1984; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull 1984;
for a review, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). As such, in this task con-
text involving an aggregate group target instead of an individual tar-
get, we expected that linguistic abstraction would no longer moderate
differential attention and recall for inconsistent versus consistent
information: Neither behavioral nor trait person descriptions were
expected to give rise to inconsistency resolution. Hence—in contrast to
our prediction and findings in Experiment 1—we expected to find no
interaction between stimulus abstraction and expectancy-consistency
in analyses of the attention and free recall data. On the other hand, in
line with our argument that linguistic abstraction has general depth-
of-processing implications independent of inconsistency resolution, we
did expect greater overall attention, accompanied by an overall recall
advantage, for concrete as compared with abstract target descriptions.
The same reasoning was applied to the judgmental implications of
trait and behavioral person descriptions. If the relationship between
linguistic abstraction and judgmental outcomes observed in Experi-
ment 1 was merely a consequence of different degrees of inconsistency
resolution, then replication of these outcomes would not be expected in
Experiment 2. On the other hand, if the judgmental outcomes observed
in Experiment 1 were instead attributable to an overall general ten-
dency toward deeper, more systematic processing of (concrete) behav-
ioral stimuli as compared to (abstract) trait stimuli, then these out-
comes should also be observable in Experiment 2. We find the latter
interpretation more plausible, in view of the theoretical considerations
outlined in the introduction. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we expected
replication of not only the overall differences in attention and recall
but also the judgmental differences observed in Experiment 1.
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METHOD
Participants were 100 paid volunteer students (46 male, 54 female)
at the Free University Amsterdam. They were recruited via a univer-
sity newspaper. Their average age was 21.4 years (range: 18 to 28
years).
As indicated above, the method was identical to that in Experiment
1 except for the nature of the target. The individual target used in the
first experiment was replaced with an aggregate target, that is,a group
of persons sharing the general characteristics listed in the biographi-
cal sketch. Participants were given no reason to believe that there was
otherwise any connection or contact among the persons making up the
aggregate target, which was given a generic label (“Group M”). Each of





In the following, we report the analyses of attention, recall, and
intrusions in two separate sections.First,we present the results for the
general hypotheses concerning differential depth-of-processing trait
as compared with behavioral language. Subsequently, we discuss the
results concerning inconsistency resolution.
Linguistic abstraction and depth of processing. The first question to
be addressed is whether behaviors, as compared with traits, were more
attended to, were recalled better, and elicited fewer intrusions. Thus,
we predicted replication of these effects, as observed in Experiment 1,
even with a nonentitative group as the social target. To examine these
predictions, relevant main effects were examined in two ANOVAs,with
estimated attention and recall as the respective dependent variables.
These ANOVAs included one between-subjects variable (stimulus
abstraction) and two within-subjects variables (item consistency, item
valence).
As predicted, estimated attention to the stimulus items (square-root
transformed) was lower in the trait condition than in the behavior con-
dition, F(1, 97) = 5.32, p < .05 (nontransformed means: MT = 2.3 s, MB =
2.8 s).10 Furthermore, there was no main effect for consistency as there
had been in Experiment 1.There was,however,a main effect of valence,
F(1, 97) = 6.05, p < .05. Greater attention was given to negative stimu-
lus items than to positive stimulus items (nontransformed means:
MN = 2.7 s, MP = 2.4 s).11
The ANOVA of proportions representing correct recall for the 12
expectancy-relevant items revealed main effects of stimulus
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abstraction and valence, as observed in Experiment 1. As predicted,
the proportion of correctly recalled items was lower in the trait condi-
tion (M = .39) than in the behavior condition (M = .46), F(1, 98) = 4.92, p
< .05. In addition, recall was better for negative stimulus items (M =
.46) than for positive stimulus items (M = .39), F(1, 98) = 6.83, p < .05.
As in the first experiment, an ANCOVA yielded evidence that the
greater overall attention given to behavioral versus trait stimuli medi-
ated the recall advantage observed for behavioral over trait stimuli
(Sobel’s Z = 1.76, p < .05). The initially significant main effect of stimu-
lus abstraction (reported above) decreased substantially following
entry of overall attention as a covariate, F(1, 96) = 2.71, p = .10. The
covariate also showed a significant regression effect, F(1, 96) = 6.68, p <
.05.
Examination of intrusions into free recall revealed the same rela-
tionships found in Experiment 1: Intrusions were more frequent in the
trait condition (M = 1.22) than in the behavior condition (M = 0.26;
Mann-Whitney Z = 4.98, p < .001). Moreover, there were more
expectancy-consistent intrusions (M = 0.51) than non-expectancy-
consistent intrusions (M = 0.23; Wilcoxon signed ranks test: Z = –4.21,
p < .001).12
In sum, even though groups served as the social target in Experi-
ment 2, it was still the case that the abstract (trait) language elicited
less attention and was recalled less effectively and less precisely than
the concrete (behavioral) language.
Inconsistency resolution. A series of analyses was conducted to test
the prediction that stimulus abstraction (trait versus behavioral infor-
mation) would not moderate the processing of information consistent
and inconsistent with expectancies for a nonentitative group target.
That is, unlike in Experiment 1, we expected no inconsistency resolu-
tion for a group target, even in the behavior condition.
The ANOVAs described above for differential attention and recall
were used to test this hypothesis concerning inconsistency resolution.
If the inconsistency resolution results of Experiment 1 were replicated
for group targets, this would be indicated by Stimulus Abstraction ×
Consistency interactions in both ANOVAs, with greater attention and
recall for inconsistent versus consistent information in the case of
behavioral but not trait stimuli. As expected, this interaction was not
observed either for attention, F(1, 97) < 1.00, or for recall, F(1, 98) <
1.00.
Thus, even though behaviors ascribed to a group target evoked
greater attention, greater recall, and fewer memory intrusions, incon-
sistency resolution was not observed for either behaviors or traits
when the target was a nonentitative group. This suggests that the
attention and recall effects were rooted in different aspects of the stim-
ulus context than the inconsistency resolution effects. The former
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appear to depend on the degree of concreteness/abstraction of stimuli,
whereas the latter require expectations of target cohesiveness
together with concrete (behavioral) stimuli.
Judgmental Outcomes
The next research question was whether judgmental outcomes with
group targets would, as hypothesized, replicate the results of Experi-
ment 1,with trait stimuli leading to more expectancy-consistent target
judgments than behavioral stimuli.
Descriptive target impressions. First, descriptive target impressions
were analyzed in an ANOVA, with stimulus abstraction as a between-
subjects independent variable and the combined measure of expectancy-
consistency (see Experiment 1) of target impressions as a dependent
variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, this ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect for stimulus abstraction, F(1, 97) = 4.87, p < .05.
The direction of this effect was as expected: Impressions were more
expectancy-consistent in the trait condition (M = 4.8) than in the
behavior condition (M = 4.6).
We also considered the possibility that the greater expectancy-
consistency of descriptive impressions observed for trait as compared
with behavioral stimuli was mediated by an overall difference in depth
of processing. However, as in Experiment 1, there were no grounds to
test this mediational hypothesis because our operationalization of
depth of processing (viz., overall attention) showed no relationship
with the expectancy-consistency of descriptive target impressions.
Evaluative target impressions. An additional prediction was that
different judgmental weights would be given to expectancies versus
the actual stimulus items, depending on whether the stimulus items
consisted of traits or behaviors. More specifically, the relative judg-
mental weight given to expectancies was predicted to be higher in the
trait condition than in the behavior condition. As in Experiment 1, this
hypothesis was tested in analyses of the three types of evaluative rat-
ings that participants provided in the written questionnaire: their
evaluative ratings of the target person and their evaluative ratings of
the two components of the stimulus information considered in isola-
tion (viz., the biographical sketch and the stimulus items). These three
sets of evaluative ratings were analyzed in two standard regression
analyses, conducted separately for participants in the trait and behav-
ioral conditions, respectively. The dependent variable in these analy-
ses was evaluative target impressions. As in Experiment 1, this mea-
sure was an average of the items from the global and Semantic-
Differential measures of evaluative impressions (Cronbach’s α = .92).
The two predictor variables were participants’ evaluative ratings of
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the biographical sketch and of the stimulus items. The regression coef-
ficients for these two predictor variables provided estimates of the
judgmental weight given to expectancies and to the stimulus items,
respectively, in the formation of evaluative impressions of the target.
The results of the regression analyses were in line with expectations
(see Table 3). The regression analysis for the trait condition showed a
strong relationship (β = .60, p < .001) between evaluative ratings of the
biographical sketch and evaluative impressions of the target, yet no
significant relationship between evaluative ratings of the stimulus
items and evaluative impressions of the target. In contrast, the analy-
sis for the behavior condition showed significant regression coeffi-
cients for both evaluative ratings of the biographical sketch (β = .53,p <
.001) and evaluative ratings of the stimulus items (β = .27, p < .05). As
can be seen in the right column of Table 3, the zero-order correlations
showed a similar pattern. These results suggest that participants in
the trait condition based their evaluative impressions of the target pri-
marily on their evaluative expectancies, whereas participants in the
behavior condition gave substantial judgmental weight both to
evaluative expectancies and to the stimulus items.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
STIMULUS ABSTRACTION AND PERSON MEMORY
The results of the two experiments reported in this article together
provide a clearer picture of specific contextual constraints operating on
inconsistency resolution. The critical modification introduced in
Experiment 2 was the use of a nonentitative group target instead of an
individual target. In line with earlier theory and research suggesting
that entitative targets elicit inconsistency resolution, whereas
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Table 3
Prediction of Evaluative Target Impressions From Evaluative Ratings of Biographical
Sketch and of Stimulus Items (Separate Standard Regression Analyses for Trait and
Behavior Conditions, Experiment 2)
β r (Zero-Order)
Behavior condition (low stimulus abstraction)a
Evaluative rating of biographical sketch .53*** .53***
Evaluative rating of stimulus items .27* .26*
Trait condition (high stimulus abstraction)b
Evaluative rating of biographical sketch .60*** .60***
Evaluative rating of stimulus items .01 .21
a. n = 47; R2 = .35.
b. n = 45; R
2
= .36.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 30, 2010jls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
nonentitative targets do not (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992; Susskind et al., 1999), inconsistency resolution was
neither predicted nor observed in Experiment 2. More specifically,
whereas the first experiment showed patterns of heightened attention
to and recall for expectancy-inconsistent behaviors but not for
expectancy-inconsistent traits, the second experiment yielded no such
evidence of inconsistency resolution at either level of stimulus
abstraction.
Besides corroborating earlier theory and research suggesting that
an entitative target is a necessary condition for the emergence of incon-
sistency resolution, the combined results of the present experiments
also tell us something new. This is namely that inconsistency resolu-
tion requires not only an entitative target but also a certain type of lin-
guistic context. Processing circumstances that lead perceivers to
engage in the cognitive work of resolving inconsistencies in behavioral
stimuli do not elicit the same attempt to resolve inconsistencies in
more abstract, trait stimuli. Hence, it appears that stimulus abstrac-
tion constitutes one of the processing circumstances that moderates
the emergence of inconsistency resolution.
According to Stangor and McMillan (1992), the reasons why some
processing circumstances elicit inconsistency resolution, whereas
other do not, can be characterized as essentially motivational and envi-
ronmental: Certain circumstances discourage (or prevent) perceivers
from carrying out the cognitive work of inconsistency resolution. This
explanation is applicable to the question of why (abstract) trait stimuli
might discourage inconsistency processing. As prior research has dem-
onstrated, abstract words and texts show a general tendency to elicit
less attention and engagement than concrete words and texts; on this
basis, one could argue that abstract target descriptions may not elicit
the requisite level of engagement needed to enable perceivers to under-
take the work of inconsistency resolution. Yet another relevant factor
is the robust tendency for poorer recall of abstract as compared with
concrete stimuli: Inconsistency resolution involves active consider-
ation and comparison of previously presented person information,
activities that would be difficult or impossible in the absence of suffi-
cient memory for this information.
Additional research will be needed to determine the precise implica-
tions of the present findings regarding inconsistency resolution for
associative network models of person memory (e.g.,Srull, 1981;Srull &
Wyer, 1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen, et al. 1984). Nevertheless, it is clear
that an expansion of existing network models will be necessary to
accommodate the present results. Unlike countless reviewers of the
person memory literature, who readily draw conclusions from studies
of memory for expectancy-consistent and -inconsistent behaviors
regarding the processing and encoding of expectancy-consistent and
-inconsistent information, the associative network models of Srull,
218 JOURNAL OF LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY / September 2002
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 30, 2010jls.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Wyer, and colleagues are very specific about the linguistic nature of the
constructs included in associative network structures they postulate:
Underlying a person concept are nodes representing the person’s
behaviors, which may be organized in relation to correspondent trait
constructs.
Although the present results demonstrate that traits cannot simply
be substituted for behaviors in existing associative network models of
person memory, further research will be needed to specify the details of
an expanded associative network model incorporating expectancy-
consistent and expectancy-inconsistent trait descriptions of a person.
Existing associative network models have emerged incrementally,
based on years of study of not only levels of recall but also recall laten-
cies, conditional probabilities, and other indicators of recall order.
Because the methodology of the present studies did not allow for the
latter analyses, additional experimental research will be needed if
existing associative network models are to be expanded to include trait
descriptors.
One possible avenue for such an expansion is offered by Carlston’s
(1994) associated systems theory of person representation. This theory
casts traits and behaviors as two of nine distinct representational
forms with differing roles and implications for person perception.
Underlying the nine representational forms are two basic dimensions
of difference: “degree of concreteness or abstraction,” and “degree of
focus on the target or the perceiver” (p. 13). Although associated sys-
tems theory is weak in specificity and lacks strong empirical founda-
tions, it does offer a promising general framework for an integrated
model of person representation. The theory’s inclusion of degree of con-
creteness or abstraction as a key conceptual dimension makes it highly
suited to accommodating the processing and encoding implications of
stimulus abstraction suggested by the present research. For the same
reason, associated systems theory could also accommodate distinc-
tions related to the level of abstraction of the person concept itself, as
investigated by prior researchers (e.g., Andersen & Klatzky, 1987;
Andersen, Klatzky, & Murray, 1990; Pryor, McDaniel, & Kott-Russo,
1986).
STIMULUS ABSTRACTION AND PROCESSING STYLE
A second important contribution of the present research was its doc-
umentation of processing and judgmental differences between behav-
ioral versus trait stimuli. Irrespective of whether the target was
entitative (an individual) or nonentitative (an aggregate group), lower
attention, lower recall, more intrusions into recall, and more expectancy-
consistent impressions were observed for trait stimuli compared to
behavioral stimuli. In other words, for (concrete) behavioral stimuli,
processing appeared to be more attentive, encoding stronger and more
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precise, and impression formation less heuristically guided than for
(abstract) trait stimuli. These results are consistent with the general
thesis advanced at the beginning of this article: Concrete language
elicits systematic processing and abstract language more cursory,
semantically driven processing.
The notion that concrete and abstract language elicit systematic
and semantically driven processing, respectively, is generally congru-
ent with theoretical positions espoused previously in the social psycho-
logical literature. It has, for instance, been argued that objects viewed
in a general or categorical fashion are thought about and responded to
very differently from objects viewed in specific or personal terms
(Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Sears, 1983). Also, Abelson
(1994) has suggested a dichotomy in cognitive activity that is based on
the level of generality of the stimulus object.More recently,S. J. Sherman
et al. (1999) have argued that a dual-processing account may explain
broadly convergent inconsistencies in responses to general versus spe-
cific cases, with general cases eliciting peripheral or heuristic process-
ing and specific cases central or systematic processing. Our interpreta-
tion of present results corroborates and builds on these points of view.
A similar processing distinction has, of course, been made in the per-
suasion literature, which distinguishes between central and periph-
eral processing of message content (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) or
between systematic and heuristic processing of persuasive messages
(Chaiken,1987).Research in the persuasion literature has been partic-
ularly successful in shedding light on the antecedent conditions neces-
sary for these respective styles of processing. Central or systematic
processing is engaged by the importance or the self-relevance of the
message content (Petty & Cacioppo, 1990), by the availability of cogni-
tive resources (Petty, Priester, & Wegener, 1994), or by the personality
trait of high need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). The
present findings suggest that stimulus abstractness/concreteness may
constitute another important factor affecting processing style; further
research will be needed to investigate whether the effects of stimulus
abstraction observed in the present studies in an impression formation
context generalize to other contexts such as the processing of persua-
sive messages.
One hypothesis with respect to depth of processing found no support
in either of the experiments reported: Estimated levels of attention to
the stimulus items could not account for the relationship between
stimulus abstraction and the expectancy-consistency of target judg-
ments, suggesting that depth of processing does not mediate this rela-
tionship. In both experiments, the process measures suggested deeper
processing and encoding and the judgment measures less expectancy-
driven processing of concrete as compared with abstract stimuli. Nev-
ertheless, there was no evidence that the judgmental effects of stimu-
lus abstraction were in fact mediated by depth of processing.
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This absence of mediational evidence is open to a number of inter-
pretations. To begin with, it could be that our imperfect estimate of
attention was simply too inaccurate, and too subject to random error, to
provide a sufficiently sensitive test of this mediational hypothesis.
Another possibility, suggested by prior research, is that the mecha-
nisms governing encoding and recall are cognitively distinct from
those governing the formation of judgments: Perceivers’ encoding and
memory of social stimuli typically show weak or no relationships with
the judgments they form based on these stimuli (Hastie & Park, 1986;
see also Anderson,1996;Anderson & Hubert,1963;Wyer,Srull,& Gordon,
1984). Additional research will be needed to clarify these issues.
LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL COGNITION
The present findings provide new evidence confirming the key role
of language in social cognition.The convergent effects observed over two
different stimulus contexts (entitative and nonentitative social tar-
gets), together with the broad basis of empirical studies from which the
present hypotheses were derived, suggest that verbal stimulus abstrac-
tion has systematic effects on processing,encoding,and social judgment.
In addition, the present studies serve to expand the domain of rele-
vance of the linguistic category model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988).
Research conducted within the framework furnished by this model can
be divided into three roughly successive phases (cf.Semin,1995).Early
work served to map out basic categories and cognitive properties of
interpersonal language, identifying systematic differences in cognitive
inferences elicited by concrete and abstract interpersonal language
(Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991). Later, language was conceptualized as a
tool with specific affordances and functions in social interaction. For
example, Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, and Stahlberg (1995) demonstrated
how language users vary the abstraction of their messages to commu-
nicate and perpetuate intergroup stereotypes. More recently, attention
has turned to language as a stimulus property with important struc-
tural consequences for social cognition. Research of the latter type sug-
gests that linguistic abstraction can have fundamental effects on mem-
ory and social judgment (e.g., Semin, 2000; Semin & De Poot, 1997;
Semin & Smith, 1999). The present findings complement and extend
this third line of research on linguistic abstraction as a stimulus prop-
erty: Formulation of person descriptions using (abstract) trait versus
(concrete) behavioral language was found to have consistent effects on
how information was processed,encoded,and used to form judgments.
Concerning the fundamental basis for relationships between lin-
guistic abstraction and social cognition, the present research leaves
one important question unanswered: What exactly is it about trait and
behavioral person descriptions that elicits systematic effects on depth
of processing and encoding and subsequently on the expectancy-
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consistency of judgments? It will be recalled from the introduction that
our selection of depth of processing as a key potential mechanism in
these effects was based on a substantial body of evidence from the
fields of cognitive psychology and linguistics, which demonstrates that
concrete verbal stimuli attract more attention and are better recalled
than abstract verbal stimuli. Unfortunately, despite the remarkable
robustness of these concreteness effects in verbal memory—generalizing
over instructional sets (e.g., semantic, imagery, and memory tasks),
stimulus types (e.g., single words, word pairs, sentences, paragraphs),
languages (e.g., English, Indian, Chinese), and memory measures (e.g.,
recall, recognition memory; see reviews by Marschark & Cornoldi,
1991; Paivio, 1995)—a convincing theoretical account for concreteness
effects has yet to be established. Countless highly controlled experi-
mental studies have been devoted to accounting for concreteness
effects on the basis of word characteristics naturally confounded with
concreteness (e.g., distinctiveness, meaningfulness, frequency of use,
and associative set size). Nevertheless, concreteness effects have been
shown to be independent of all of these word properties (Gee, Nelson, &
Krawczyk, 1999; Marschark & Cornoldi, 1991; Nelson & Schreiber,
1992; Paivio, 1995). In sum, although these studies help to rule out
alternative explanations, they leave us without an unequivocal answer
to the question of what exactly it is about verbal concreteness that
yields robust effects on processing and mental representation.
LANGUAGE AND THE STUDY OF SOCIAL COGNITION
The present results also underscore the need for greater attention to
the nature and methodological implications of linguistic stimuli used
in social psychological research. This point of view, which we are not
the first to advance (e.g., Ostrom, 1984; Semin, 1995; Semin &
Marsman, 2000; Wyer et al., 1992), is clearly supported by the main
results of Experiments 1 and 2. In view of the numerous processing and
judgmental differences observed for trait versus behavioral target
descriptions, it is clear that conclusions about social perception derived
from research with behavioral stimuli cannot be assumed to generalize
to trait or other forms of person information.This point acquires partic-
ular relevance if one considers that generalizations from the behavior-
based person memory paradigm about the processing and encoding of
consistent and inconsistent person information can be found in numer-
ous textbooks and review articles.
To close on a historical note, the present results cast new light on the
paradigm shift in person perception research that took place 20 years
ago, from trait stimuli (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Asch, 1946) to
behavioral stimuli (e.g., Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981). This
methodological shift, which led to unanticipated findings, was accom-
panied by a rapid change in the framing of research issues and in
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models of person perception: Prior to the paradigm shift, person per-
ception was cast almost exclusively in terms of heuristic, expectancy-
driven processing (e.g., Taylor & Crocker, 1981); since then, models have
come to recognize the possibility of individuated or data-driven pro-
cessing emphasizing unexpected information (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske
& Neuberg, 1990; Srull & Wyer, 1989). In light of the specific relation-
ships between linguistic abstraction and processing style suggested by
the present research, we wonder whether this theoretical expansion
may have been set in motion largely coincidentally,as a result of the stim-
ulus paradigm shift catalyzed by Hastie and Kumar’s (1979) study.
APPENDIX A
Expectancy-Inducing Biographical Sketches
Used in Experiments 1 and 2
Housewife target
Marion Brown is 47 years old, is married, and has several children. She is
primarily a homemaker but does occasional sewing work for a clothing
warehouse. She completed three years at a vocational secondary school.
Knitting is her hobby.
Businessman target
Michael Brown is 47 years old, is married, and has several children. He is fi-
nancial director at an international bank. He has a university degree in eco-
nomics, with a minor in finance and an MBA from a university in England.
His work is his hobby.
APPENDIX B
Trait and Behavioral Stimulus Items Used in Experiments 1 and 2
Trait Stimuli Behavioral Stimuli
1. (H+) nurturant 1. (H+) brought her/his child’s forgotten lunch to school
2. (H+) unselfish 2. (H+) worked as a volunteer at the local hospital
3. (H+) empathic 3.(H+) cried during a documentary on famine in Africa
4. (H–) submissive 4. (H–) asked for spouse’s permission to buy a watch
5. (H–) self-effacing 5. (H–) disregarded his/her own wishes regarding
family vacation
6. (H–) simple-minded 6. (H–) spent an afternoon reading gossip magazines
7. (B+) assertive 7. (B+) expressed a controversial opinion
8. (B+) achievement
oriented 8. (B+) worked long days on an important project
9. (B+) intelligent 9. (B+) spoke in four different languages at a reception
10. (B–) aloof 10. (B–) avoided the neighborhood party
11. (B–) status hungry 11. (B–) joined the most prestigious golf club
12. (B–) authoritarian 12. (B–) seized control over a meeting
Note. H = stimuli expected of the housewife target and unexpected of the businessman
target; B = stimuli expected of the businessman target and unexpected of the housewife
target; (+) = evaluatively positive stimuli; (–) = evaluatively negative stimuli. Each ex-
perimental participant viewed either the trait stimulus set (all 12 items in the left col-
umn) or the behavioral stimulus set (all 12 items in the right column).
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NOTES
1. In two of the four studies using trait stimuli (Kanungo & Das, 1960; Kanungo &
Dutta, 1966), the independent variable under investigation was not the expectancy-
consistency of the trait stimuli but rather their motivational implications in an inter-
group context.
2. The authors would like to thank Roos Vonk for making these data available for
reanalysis.
3. Average evaluative valence of the stimulus items did not differ between the trait
and behavioral stimulus sets. Similarly, the trait and behavioral stimuli did not differ in
their average consistency or inconsistency with target expectancies.
4. Participant gender and target gender yielded no effects of interest and were not
included in any of the analyses reported in this article. Minor inconsistencies in degrees
of freedom are due to missing data.
5. These findings must be interpreted with caution because they are based on an es-
timate of attention to the (short) trait stimulus sentences versus the (longer) behavioral
stimuli (see the Method section). An ANOVA of actual observation times revealed com-
parable results, except that the main effect for item abstraction was much stronger, F(1,
104) = 76.33, p < .001.
6. Correct recall for the six expectancy-irrelevant stimulus items and for the infor-
mation contained in the biographical sketches did not differ between the two stimulus
abstraction conditions.
7. The main effect for valence is consistent with prior research showing that nega-
tive information attracts more attention, and has a stronger influence on judgments,
than positive information (for reviews, see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991).
However, other studies on the relationship between valence and recall have shown
mixed results (e.g., Matlin & Stang, 1978; Pratto & John, 1991).
8. A MANOVA in which the two measures were entered as separate dependent vari-
ables produced fully comparable results.
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the data analytic procedures used in Experiment 2
were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
10. One case was deleted from the attention analyses as an outlier.
11. An analysis of actual observation times showed similar results, except that the
main effect for item abstraction was much stronger, F(1, 98) = 34.65, p < .001.
12.As in Experiment 1, correct recall for the six expectancy-irrelevant stimulus items
and for the information contained in the biographical sketches did not differ between the
two stimulus abstraction conditions.
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